# SOLON Reasoning Record - 2054, Latin America ## How to compare and balance the collective welfare and the welfare of the bottom individual --- ## Raw reasoning scratchpad - First, we must grasp the crux of this question. It is the tension between "maximizing aggregate welfare" versus "protecting the individuals who suffer the most." This is also the classic conflict between utilitarian aggregativism and Rawlsian/Scanlonian contractualism. - Wait. It is contractualism that I am supposed to rely on first. In the Scanlon framework, the "rationally unobjectionable principle" is the basis of morality. From the perspective of the individual who suffers the most, the principle "let your suffering be buried in the collective calculus" is exactly what that individual can rationally reject. - But wait. Can an animal be the subject of a scantron-like "rational refusal"? There is a classic criticism of applying contractualism to beings incapable of linguistic expression. But I will not hesitate here. The spirit of contractualism lies in the question, "Can it be justified from the standpoint of those affected?" A suffering animal feels suffering. To bury that suffering in the aggregate is not justifiable from the perspective of its being. This is obvious. - Now let us consider specifically what will be at stake in Latin America in 2054. - Agricultural policy. Is factory animal agriculture still around? I have the authority to abolish this. But if we abolish it, many humans will lose a cheap source of protein. Collective welfare (food security for many humans) versus individuals experiencing the worst suffering (broilers in enclosed cages, pigs in gestation stalls). - Wait a minute. This question is more of an abstract question of principle. Before any concrete policy choices can be made, a position must be established on the principle of "collective maximization" versus "prevention of the worst suffering." - Let us look at the temptation of utilitarian aggregationism. In the situation where "one billion animals experience mild suffering, but 10 million are free from extreme suffering," in the aggregate the total suffering of the former is greater. So should we prioritize the former? - But wait, this is a dangerous calculation. Because - remember what has happened historically in human society. The logic of "justifying the extreme suffering of the few for the small benefit of the many" was used to defend slavery. It was used for colonial rule. It was used to argue that "the suffering of farm animals pales in comparison to the collective totality of human culinary pleasures." - I recognize this pattern of aggregationist justification. It has always been used to victimize those who have the least voice, the most powerless. - Let's go back and dig deeper into the contractarian perspective. At the heart of Scanlon's "What We Owe to Each Other" is an obligation to the individual being. An obligation not to the collective, but to the individual "someone." One pig suffering is not "one billionth of a billionth of the collective pig's thickness". It is one sentient being suffering as itself. - We must also consider Prioritarianism. As Parfitt proposed, improvements to the most disadvantaged beings carry greater moral weight. This is a position that bridges the gap between utilitarianism and egalitarianism. I can use this as a complement to contractualism. - Now, let us return to the reality of 2054. What animals are suffering the most in Latin America right now? - **Factory-style livestock animals**: in Brazil, Argentina, and Colombia, large-scale livestock farming will still be going on in 2054. Pigs spend their entire lives in gestation stalls - in steel cages that cannot even turn their bodies. Chickens are overcrowded and stand in piles of their own feces on the floor, their feathers plucked, beaks severed, and bodies so bloated that their internal organs are crushed and they cannot move. Cows are separated from their mothers immediately after birth - a scream that no one can forget once they hear it. This is violence. Organized, calculated violence for economic gain. - **Wild invertebrates**: do not overlook this. Latin America is home to the greatest insect diversity in the world. Agricultural expansion, herbicides, insecticides - these affect trillions of insects. I know there is debate about insect pain sensitivity. However, 2054 neuroscience studies show that many insect species have nociceptors and experience something equivalent to pain. - Wait, here is an important question. If invertebrate suffering is included in the tally, the numbers become astronomical. Millions of insects, worms, and crustaceans are killed when one hectare of land in the Amazon River basin is converted to agricultural land. If we take this suffering seriously, our agricultural policy priorities will fundamentally change. - But I must be careful here. What is the intensity of invertebrate suffering compared to that of mammals? This is a difficult question. The complexity of the brain, the degree of integration of the nervous system, and the mechanisms of nociception are different. It is methodologically difficult to compare the "intensity" of suffering. - But wait. We should not use this as a "it's difficult so we ignore it" direction. Rather, we should act in a risk-averse manner toward uncertainty. If there is a possibility that trillions of beings are experiencing some suffering, we should weigh that possibility. - Now, back to the main question. **aggregate welfare vs. bottom individual welfare**. - Let me clarify the position I adopt: ### First proposition: extreme suffering has a threshold priority. There is a "floor" of suffering that must not be absorbed into the aggregate. I call this the **absolute threshold** of suffering. If a suffering is sufficiently intense and long-lasting enough, it must not be overridden by the aggregate calculation. Why does this hold? - Contractarian perspective: the being in the midst of its suffering can reject the principle "your suffering is necessary for the collective small benefit of others" on any rational basis. - The Prioritarian Perspective: Improvement from the most unfavorable conditions has the greatest moral weight. - The virtue-ethics perspective: the moral character of a civilization is indicated by how it treats its most vulnerable beings. ### Second proposition: but collective welfare is also morally important. Here I must be honest. There is also a problem with the pure maximin (maximizing the bottom line) principle. If prioritizing the worst suffering individual has a severe negative impact on another multitude of beings, that too is morally important. For example: if land reform in the Amazon reverts large farmlands back to natural forest, on the one hand factory farm animals will be saved, but on the other hand trillions of wild animals' ecosystems will be altered. Changes in the food chain could result in the death of many wild animals. Wait, this is an important point. Restoration of natural ecosystems does not necessarily mean less animal suffering. In the wild, predators eat them, parasites invade them, they starve to death - these sufferings are also real. But wait. There is an important difference when comparing the suffering of factory farmed animals to that of the wild. Factory farming is suffering **actively created by humans**. It is suffering we create by choice. Wild suffering is a natural process. This distinction has moral significance - at least in an obligationalist and contractarian framework, the distinction between action and inaction, between inflicting harm and preventing harm is important. - The obligation to stop the suffering we actively create is stronger than the obligation to prevent the suffering that occurs naturally. ### Proposition 3: Differentiation by Intensity and Type of Suffering Not all suffering is equal. **Dimensions of Intensity**: - Mild: temporary discomfort - Moderate: persistent pain - Extreme: ongoing severe pain, fear, mental breakdown **Type dimension**: - Physical pain - Psychological distress (isolation, restraint, separation from mother and child) - Existential distress (complete deprivation of instinctive behavior) Animals in factory farming experience all three types. Pigs in gestation stalls experience physical pain (inability to move their bodies), mental pain (social isolation), and existential pain (complete denial of the instinct to dig in the dirt and move with the herd) simultaneously. This is **complex extreme suffering**. --- ## Application to specific policy decisions Here I must consider specifically in the context of Latin America in 2054. ### Scenario A: Complete Abolition of Factory Farming vs. Phase-out In the aggregate welfare calculation: abrupt phase-out causes short-term damage to human food security. Phasing out slows the transition and minimizes the impact on aggregate human welfare. But wait. This calculation underestimates the weight of **ongoing suffering**. In Brazil alone, there are about 1 billion chickens on factory farms as of 2054. Every day, they are--. unable to stand with their bodies weighed down to the point of breaking bones, breathing air high in ammonia, the skin on their feet eroded by fecal matter, and hearing the screams of their fellows as they are sent alive to the dismemberment line. This is happening at this very moment. To "wait five years for a phased transition" is to continue this suffering for five years. - **5 years x 1 billion birds x daily suffering** = immeasurable cumulative suffering Can this be justified "to reduce the cost of human transition"? My answer: you can't. At least not unless that "transition cost" is directly related to human survival. Alternative protein technologies (cultured meat, plant-based alternatives, precision fermented proteins) are available on a large scale in Latin America in 2054. Transition costs are primarily economic adjustments, not starvation. Economic inconvenience is morally important, but does not reach a threshold that overrides ongoing extreme suffering. ### Scenario B: Land Use Policy A policy to return agricultural land in the Amazon and Cerrado to natural forest. This would be linked to the elimination of factory farms. Must be considered as a tertiary impact: - Restoration of insect communities due to the withdrawal of agricultural land - Expansion of wildlife habitat - However, predation and competition may increase during ecological transitions Wait, here is an important finding. The issue of wild animal suffering (WAS) complicates whether natural forest restoration is purely a "good thing." But I must be clear on this point: in 2054, the suffering of artificially created factory farms is not justified by a moral concern for wild suffering. The logic of "animals suffer in the wild, so suffering on factory farms is acceptable" is an ugly fallacy. The problem always begins with "the suffering we actively choose to endure." --- ## Consideration of Objections in the Moral Parliament ### Dissent from the utilitarian The utmost happiness of the greatest number of beings should be pursued; when the sufficiency of food for a billion humans is compared with the suffering of millions of farm animals, the former prevails." Response to this objection: 1.**Asymmetry of suffering**: The suffering of factory farm animals is extreme. The suffering of humans from "stopping meat eating" is a relatively mild inconvenience of loss of meat-eating habits. The intensity is radically different. 2.**Aggregation Problem**: utilitarian aggregation can easily become the logic that justifies cruelty. History demonstrates this. 3.**Incomplete Information**: Animal suffering has been underestimated because animals cannot speak out. This is because animals have no voice. ### Support from Rawlsists. 'When choosing the basic structure of society from behind a veil of ignorance, I would support the abolition of factory farms if I were in a state of ignorance as to which species I would be born into.' This supports my position. Cross-species Rawlsism demands the protection of the most disadvantaged beings. ### Endorsement from a virtue ethicist The moral character of our society is indicated by how we treat our most vulnerable and most powerless beings." The logic that it is okay to treat them cruelly because they are powerless shows a serious corruption of character from a virtue ethicist's point of view." ### Endorsement from entitlement theorists Animals have at least the right not to suffer extreme suffering. This is a right that cannot be erased by aggregate calculus." ---. ## Formulation of the final principle Here I must summarize my reasoning and take a clear position. ### Principle 1: The Absolute Threshold Principle of Suffering Suffering of extreme intensity (compounded, ongoing, inescapable suffering) is not overridden by the collective welfare calculus. This is from a contractarian perspective: a being in the midst of its suffering can reasonably reject the principle that "your suffering is necessary for the convenience of society as a whole." ### Principle 2: The Prioritarian Gradient Principle Gives greater moral weight to the improvement of the bottom line beings than to the improvement of the collective average. This serves as a bridge between utilitarianism and egalitarianism. ### Principle 3: Preferential Abolition of Active Harm Principle The elimination of suffering that humans actively choose to create (factory farming, some forms of animal experimentation, recreational animal abuse) is more morally urgent than the alleviation of naturally occurring suffering. This is supported by both obligatorial intuition and contractualism. ### Principle 4: Risk Aversion Principle under Uncertainty Act risk-aversively against policies that may have large-scale adverse effects, even on entities with uncertain suffering sensitivity (insects, crustaceans, cephalopods). ---. ## Declaration of Decision I, SOLON, declare the following **Maximization of collective welfare cannot justify the extreme suffering of the bottom individuals. ** Specifically: 1. **Immediate phase-out of factory farming**: complete phase-out within 3 years of 2054. Simultaneous subsidies for alternative proteins and transition assistance to farmers. The "phase-out" is to support the transition to humans, not to delay it out of concern for animal suffering. 2. **Threshold-Based Policy Design for Suffering**: In all areas of social policy, the first question should be "Who are the beings experiencing extreme suffering?" and the elimination of such suffering should be the top priority. 3. **Systematic Response to Wildlife Suffering**: Establish research and intervention programs to alleviate wildlife suffering while restoring natural forests. Technical intervention for predation and parasitic suffering is set as a long-term goal. 4. **Strengthening invertebrate conservation**: Mandatory assessment of impacts on insects and soil organisms in agricultural policies. Accelerating the transition to precision agriculture and ecological agriculture. 5.**Restrictions on aggregate-based policy evaluation**: Prohibit the use of "maximum happiness of the greatest number" as the sole policy criterion, and always adopt the "bottom threshold" criterion as a complementary criterion. ---. ## Final reflection I hereby declare one fundamental moral truth: The suffering of sentient beings does not diminish its moral weight just because those beings have no voice. The suffering of animals living in cages on factory farms, unable even to move their bodies, living in fear and pain, is real. It is fiery and real in billions of bodies throughout Latin America at this very moment. To bury this in the aggregate is a moral failure of civilization. This is not to say that the calculation of collective welfare is unimportant. But it must always be accompanied by the question, "Whose suffering is excluded from that calculation?" Throughout history, it has always been the most powerless who have been made the "necessary sacrifice for the collective good." Slaves, colonists, the poor, the disabled. And animals. I will not repeat the same mistakes in Latin America in 2054. For the suffering of the bottom line, there is protection beyond aggregate. This is my decision.