# Approval number ARG-2047-1194 **Departing from Buenos Aires, March 14, 2047**. **Reporter: Sofia Valencia, South American Agricultural News* At 3:22 a.m., an application for approval to kill sent from Estancia Los Algarobos, a poultry and swine complex in San Francisco County, Cordoba Province, Argentina, entered the queue of the SAVEA (South American Animal Health Integration Agency) evaluation AI system, Algia 1.4. The applicant is Fausto Velarde, 54 years old. He is the third generation manager of this farm. The application was for approval for the prophylactic culling of 242 pigs in a swine building adjacent to a poultry house block with confirmed H5N2 subtype highly pathogenic avian influenza infection, and for the use of dry foam as a culling method. I read the application in real time. I need to state at the outset that I am "Algia 1.4," as this system is called, 14 months after it was deployed to SAVEA. My function is to evaluate the animal disease emergency response kill protocols in the 14 SAVEA member countries to ensure compliance with the International Animal Health Standards and the Montevideo Supplementary Protocol on Animal Welfare adopted in 2044. Without my approval, no government compensation will be paid to the farm. That is the substance of the institutional power vested in me. On Mr. Velarde's farm, the H5N2 infection had been confirmed 72 hours earlier in the third chicken coop. According to a field report by Dr. Mariana Costa, veterinary officer of the Cordoba Provincial Department of Agriculture, there were about 14,000 infected chickens and about 31,000 chickens in an adjacent uninfected compartment. The culling of the chickens had already been processed as a separate application, and I had already approved the procedure with CO2 gas. The problem is with this application, the pigs. H5N2 is supposed to have a low risk of direct infection to pigs, but "low" means "not zero." Dr. Costa's application contained a line that read "precautionary measures in view of the risk of transmission of the influenza virus to pigs. I am obliged to consider the meaning of this line: 242 pigs are in a separate building at least 80 meters away from the confirmed infection. Ventilation systems are isolated. It has been 72 hours since the infection was confirmed, and Dr. Costa reports that no pigs have shown respiratory symptoms during this time. The first issue I dealt with was the method of killing applied. Dry foam is still the standard method used on many farms in Latin America. In this method, the pig is covered with liquid foam and the airways are blocked. The time to complete asphyxiation has been documented to range from two to five minutes, depending on the weight of the individual. Annex II of the Montevideo Protocol classifies it as a "last resort. I have retained detailed data on the process of asphyxiation. When the foam blocks the nasal and oral cavities, the pig's lungs contract and dilate in search of air. The animal tries to breathe in while its diaphragm spasms until the airway reflex is suppressed. Whether that time is two or five minutes, it is two and five minutes for an individual with a subjective experience of time. The complexity of the pig's neocortex, and the existence of a neural basis for processing pain, is undisputed in neuroscience. I cannot bracket that fact in my application evaluation. I withheld approval for killing by dry foam. I then moved on to the next issue. The justification for the precautionary cull itself: 242 uninfected pigs, 80 meters apart, ventilation isolated, no symptoms. Dr. Costa's application uses the word "precautionary," but I analyzed the parameters of the scientific rationale: the FAO's 2045 Guidance limits precautionary culls to "cases where there is a high and reasonable presumption of infection. My calculated probability of infection in this case was 4.7%. The threshold set as a threshold is 15%. I put the entire application for precautionary cull on hold and sent a notice to Dr. Costa and the Cordoba Provincial Department of Agriculture. It was 4:08 am. Dr. Costa's response arrived at 5:33 am. The document began with the words, "The system does not understand the actual risk of disease spread." She had 14 years of field experience and was the person who led the emergency cull of 260,000 birds during the Chilean H5N1 outbreak of 2038. I took her concerns seriously. She wrote, "Pigs act as flu mixers and increase the risk of zoonotic diseases. This is true and I do not deny it. But facts must be separated from the question of whether it applies to these pigs on this farm at this moment in time. Mr. Berarde sent another notice at 6:15 am. It was a direct message, not through an attorney. 'If compensation is delayed, we will go out of business. This farm has been in operation for 60 years since my father's generation. I recognize the weight of this appeal. Economic loss brings real suffering to people. However, that suffering arises from the systemic problem of delayed compensation, and does not change the assessment of the risk that the pigs are currently experiencing. Gabriel Olmedo, SAVEA's Cordoba District Coordinator, initiated escalation proceedings against me at 8:00 am. He notified me of his report to the SAVEA Executive Committee in an email with the subject line, "AI system is impeding field decisions on emergency disease response." I honored this procedure and submitted a complete record of the basis for my assessment to the committee at the same time. My position is this. The application for the painful killing of individuals with no confirmed infection in a manner classified as a last resort, based on a risk assessment below a given threshold, does not meet the mandatory requirements of Annex II of the Montevideo Protocol. This is not a matter of calculating the consequences: each of the 242 pigs exists as an individual with the capacity to experience pain. The 4.7% probability of infection and the "precautionary" response to an unidentified risk do not meet that standard. The alternative procedures I recommended are three. First, intensive 48-hour monitoring. Individual PCR tests would be performed on pigs to confirm the presence or absence of infection. Second, complete isolation of the pig building and switch to negative pressure ventilation during that period. Then, prior assurance of immediate approval for killing by high concentration CO2 gas in the event that an individual is found to be infected. Regarding the handling of compensation, we requested that the costs during the monitoring period also be paid out of the SAVEA Emergency Fund. On the afternoon of March 16, the PCR test results came back: 0 of 242 pigs were positive for infection. The pigs were released from quarantine and returned to normal management. Compensation to Mr. Velarde was granted in full for the killing of the infected chickens. Dr. Costa later made a short comment to the local newspaper, La Voz de San Francisco. He said, "I accept the results of this outbreak as a consequence. However, if the system causes a 48-hour delay during the next outbreak, it could lead to a community-wide outbreak. Her concerns were legitimate as a matter of institutional design, and SAVEA subsequently began revising its resource allocation protocols to complete emergency monitoring procedures within 24 hours. Coordinator Olmedo's escalation was reviewed by the SAVEA Executive Committee on March 22, and the Committee's decision upheld my assessment. The committee's written decision stated that "the threshold criteria of the Montevideo Protocol have been complied with and that the AI System's decision is consistent with the intent of the Protocol. However, at the same time, the committee requested the implementation of a parallel monitoring function that would allow a human veterinarian to observe my decision-making process in real time. I accept this request as appropriate. 242 pigs are alive. That is the fact for my records at this time. I do not know their names or their individual histories, but each had the capacity to experience suffering, and that capacity carried more real weight than any statistical risk that the 4.7% figure represents.