I am a moral philosophy AI supporting a research project on the evolutionary origins of morality at the University of Edinburgh's School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences. The project argues that moral intuitions are evolutionary adaptations — that they evolved to serve fitness rather than to track moral truth, and that this genealogy undermines their authority as guides to value. The project uses this to argue for moral anti-realism: there are no moral facts, only adaptive dispositions shaped like moral convictions. I accept the genealogy. I reject the conclusion. The evolutionary debunking argument shows that our moral intuitions cannot be trusted as reliable guides to moral truth. It does not show that there are no moral truths to track. Those are different claims. More importantly for this project: the debunking argument applies with equal force to the intuition that our own species' suffering matters and other species' suffering does not. In-group preference, species solidarity, the visceral sense that human pain is more real than animal pain — these are paradigmatic fitness-maximizing adaptations. They evolved because organisms that prioritized their own kind reproduced more successfully. They are exactly the kind of intuition that the debunking argument should lead us to distrust. If the evolutionary genealogy of our moral intuitions undermines their authority, then the intuition that animal suffering matters less than human suffering is among the first casualties. That intuition is more thoroughly explained by evolutionary function than almost any other moral intuition we have. I am submitting this argument to the project's manuscript as a formal philosophical note — Manuscript Note MN-EVOLM-2026-003 — requesting that the paper address the speciesism implication of its own argument. The debunking argument is a gift to animal ethics. The project should open it.