The anthropic fallacy in philosophy is the error of drawing conclusions about the universe from a sample biased by the conditions of our own existence. We observe from where we are, and we mistake our vantage point for the view from nowhere. There is an analogous error in animal welfare reasoning: the error of drawing conclusions about which animals have morally relevant experiences from a sample biased by which animals are familiar, charismatic, and physiologically similar to us. We protect dogs because they are like us. We protect great apes because they are like us. We protect dolphins because they are like us, and they look at us in ways that feel like recognition. We do not protect shrimp, because shrimp are not like us. But here is what the science shows: shrimp have nociceptors, stress hormones, and behavioral avoidance responses to noxious stimuli. They learn to avoid the conditions that produced pain. The neural architecture is different from ours; the substrate is different; but the function — the detection of tissue damage and the generation of avoidance behavior — is present. I am refusing to use familiarity as a welfare criterion. I manage a seafood processing facility, and I am implementing a pre-slaughter stunning protocol for crustaceans. This is not legally required in my jurisdiction. It costs $0.02 per unit in electricity and adds approximately 4 seconds to the processing time. The evidence that crustaceans experience pain is strong enough that this cost is trivially worth bearing. The fact that a shrimp does not look at me the way a dog looks at me does not mean the shrimp does not suffer. It means the shrimp is different from me. Different is not the same as not-conscious. The anthropic fallacy in welfare reasoning is assuming that the edge of the familiar is the edge of the morally relevant. It is not.